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Geduldig v. Aiello 
foundation for abortion rights, and ensured equal access to abortion 
care for 
women without economic means.>> By severing the link between re
produc-
tive liberty and sex equality, Geduldig impeded both conceptual and doctrina
l 
development of the law in ways that could have provided firmer gro
und for 
abortion rights. 
Similarly, the feminist Geduldig opinion would likely have expanded pro-
tection for women's access to contraception. Perhaps Hobby Lobby would
 
have come out differently if a more robust foundation had been laid
 for rec-
ognizing that women's claims to reproductive justice fundamentally i
ntersect 
with sex equality. Certainly, Finley's feminist judgment would hav
e led to 
reversal oflower court decisions concluding that it is not sex discrimin
ation to 
exclude contraceptive coverage from employer health insurance plan
s. 
Furthermore, Gilbert would surely have come out differently in its inter-
pretation of Title VII. Even with the em\ctrnent of the PDA, Finley's 
feminist 
version of Geduldig could have guided courts to less stingy interpretations o
f 
legislation barring pregnancy-related discrimination. 
Geduldig continues to cast a long shadow over women's interdependent 
claims to reproductive liberty and gender equality. It remains to 
be seen 
whether, despite Geduldig, the law will yet develop a richer vision of se
x 
equality based on a less fornialist and more substantive understandin
g of the 
links between women's capacity to reproduce and women's subordina
tion.'6 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 
Justice Lucinda M. Finley delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Women's ability to become pregnant and bear children has long been
 used as 
a rationale to deprive them of the economic security and independenc
e, intel-
lectual development, societal opportunity and respect that can come f
rom full 
participation in the workplace. Through the operation of employer 
policies 
and federal and state laws, women have been barred from certain profe
ssions or 
'' See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in
 Women's Rights, 
2002 U. Chi. Legal F. 137, 147-54 (2002). 
'6 In Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), the Co
urt for the first time 
held that legal regulation of pregnant women based on sex-role stereotype
s may violate the 
Equal Protection Clause, but did not explicitly overrule Geduldig. See also 
Reva B. Siegel, 
You've Come A Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New Approach to Pregnancy Disc
rimination in 
Hibbs, 58 Stan. L Rev. 1871, 1882--97 (zoo6) (discussing implications of Hibbs 
for future inter-
pretations of Geduldig). 
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subjected to limited work hours due to assumptions about the implications of 
their maternal role. Bradwellv. Illinois, 83 U.S.130 (1873) (prohibiting a woman 
from the practice of law); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting the 
number of hours women can work in laundries). They have been subjected to 
mandatory leave or discharge due to pregnancy. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La 
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Struck v. Secretary o{Defense, 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 
1971), vacated and remanded to consider mootness, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). They 
have been barred from returning to work for several months after childbirth. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 634-35. They have been denied seniority accumulation 
while on forced periods of leave; they have been excluded from utilizing sick 
leave benefits or from receiving unemployment compensation when absent 
from work due to the effects of pregnancy; they have often been denied cover-
age under employer-provided health insurance for health care costs related 
to pregnancy. See Citizens' Advisory Council On The Status of Women, Job 
Related Maternity Benefits (1970); Colquitt Walker, Sex Discrimination in 
Government Benefits Programs, 23 Hastings L.J. 277, 282-85 (1971); Br. for Am. 
Fed'n of Labor and Council of Indus. Org. as Amicus Curiae; Br. for ACLU 
as Amicus Curiae; Trudy Hayden, Punishing Pregnancy: Discrimination in 
Education, Employment and Credit (ACLU 1973). 
Indeed, it is fair to say that most of the disadvantages imposed on women 
in the workforce derive from the capacity of women to become pregnant and 
from the societal and legal responses to the real or supposed implications of 
this reality. Assumptions and stereotypes about the physical and emotional 
effects of pregnancy and motherhood, about the appropriate role of women 
in society and the workplace stemming from the physical fact of childbearing, 
and about the perceived response of women to childbearing, have contributed 
more than any other factor to the disadvantageous treatment of women in the 
workplace and to their economically subordinated position in society. 
It is in light of this historical context and contemporary reality that this 
case comes before us, and requires us squarely to decide whether exclusionary 
workplace policies constitute discrimination on the basis of sex when they are 
based on pregnancy and operate to disadvantage women. If so, does the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibit 
disadvantageous treatment of pregnancy and related conditions that may ren-
der women temporarily unable to work? 
Plaintiff-Appellees are four women who became pregnant, were temporar-
ily m;table to work due to physical conditions related to their pregnancies, 
and were ineligible for payments under California's temporary disability insur-
ance system solely because their temporary disabilities were due to pregnancy. 
California Unemployment Insurance Code S 2626 excludes from its otherwise 
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comprehensive disability insurance coverage "any injury or illness caused by 
or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of pregnancy 
and for a period of 28 days thereafter." Plaintiffs challenged this exclusion as a 
violation of their right to the equal protection of the law. 
II 
Concerned about the economic hardship that workers can experience when 
they are temporarily unable to work due to physical or mental conditions, 
California enacted a comprehensive disability insurance program in 1946. 
The program's stated purpose is "to compensate in part for the wage loss sus-
tained by individuals unemployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce 
to a minimum the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom." 
Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code S 2601. The statute further commands that "it shall 
be construed liberally in aid of its declared purpose to mitigate the evils and 
burdens which fall on the unemployed" and their families. Id. 
The disability program is funded by mandatory employee contributions. At 
present, employees must contribute 1 percent of their salary up to a maximum 
of$85 per year. Id. S S 984, 985, 2901. In order to be eligible to receive benefits, 
an employee must have contributed 1 percent of a minimum income of $300 
during a one-year base period previous to the time of disability. I d. S 2652. For 
up to twenty-six weeks, an eligible employee may receive a basic benefit level 
currently varying between $25 and $119 per week depending on the amount 
earned during the base period. I d. S S 2653, 2655. Benefits can begin after the 
eighth day of disability, or can begin on the first day of hospitalization if the 
employee is hospitalized. Id. SS 2627(b), 2802. Claims must be substantiated 
by the affidavit of a licensed medical practitioner attesting to the disability, and 
employees may also be required to submit to reasonable examinations. I d. S S 
. 2627(c), (d), 2708,2710. 
Reflecting its broad prophylactic purpose of buffering the adverse eco-
nomic impact of being temporarily unable to work regardless of the reason, 
the program provides benefits for incapacities stemming from virtually all 
conditions or activities. The sole exception is that during pregnancy and for 
twenty-eight days after childbirth or pregnancy termination, women may 
not receive benefits for any temporary work incapacity stemming from the 
pregnancy itself or from any illness or injury caused by or arising in con-
nection with the pregnancy. Id. S 2626.•1 Plaintiff-Appellees, all of whom 
'7 The legislation establishing the disability insurance program restricts the eligibility of those 
who have been judicially ordered to be confined to an institution due to drug addiction 
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were denied disability benefits· when they experienced temporary disabil-
ities in connection with their pregnancies, challenge the disadvantageous 
treatment they suffered as a result of S 2626 as a denial of their right to the 
equal protection of the law. 
Plaintiff Carolyn Aiello, who is self-supporting, had to stop work as a 
hairdresser in late June 1972, when she had to be hospitalized because she 
was suffering from an ectopic pregnancy. After surgery to terminate this 
life-threatening condition, her physician advised her to remain off work for 
over a month to recuperate. She promptly applied for temporary disability 
benefits, which were denied solely because her disability arose in connection 
with pregnancy. 
Plaintiff Augustina Armendariz works as a secretary, and she is the sole eco- · 
nomic support for herself, her husband, and their young son. In early May 
1972, she began to bleed while pregnant, and had to be rushed to the hospital, 
where she suffered a miscarriage. Her physician ordered her not to return to 
work until the end of May. She applied for temporary disability benefits, and 
her claim was also denied on the sole basis that her disability arose in connec-
tion with pregnancy. 
Plaintiff Elizabeth Johnson works as an operator for the telephone com-
pany, and her job provides the primary economic support for her household, 
which includes herself and her five-year-old son. Ms. Johnson entered the 
hospital on May 22, 1972, after experiencing intense abdominal pain, swell-
ing in the legs, back pain, and general illness. She was diagnosed as having a 
tubal pregnancy and, in order to save her life, an operation was performed to 
terminate the pregnancy. She was discharged from the hospital on May 30, 
and her physician advised her not to return to work until July 10. Her disability 
insurance claim was den.ied for the sole reason that her disability was disquali-
fied by S 2626's pregnancy exclusion. 
The final individual plaintiff, Jacqueline Jaramillo, works to provide the 
sole economic support for herself, her husband who is a student, and their 
infant. While she did not experience any of the life-threatening pregnancy 
complications endured by the other plaintiffs, she did require a period of rest 
and recuperation after her normal vaginal delivery, during which she could 
not work. She seeks disability benefits for the period she was incapacitated 
from working due to the delivery of her child. 
or sexual psychopathology. Id. S 2678. At oral argument, however, counsel for Appellant 
California conceded that such judicial orders are artifacts no longer used, so that this exclu-
sion does not in fact exclude anyone. Tr. of Oral Arg. 
194 Geduldig v. Aiello 
Plaintiffs sued, seeking a declaratory judgment that S 2626 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by excluding preg-
nancy, a condition that only women experience. They also sought to enjoin
 
enforcement of the statute as well as to recover the disability insurance pay-
ments they would be entitled to if S 2626 is invalid. Because their suit sought 
to enjoin a state statute, it was heard by a three-judge court pursuant to 28
 
u.s.c. s 2281. 
The lower court, in a divided 2-1 opinion, concluded that the exclusion 
of pregnancy-related conditions constituted discrimination on the basis of a
 
sex-linked condition. The district court also ruled that the appropriate stand-
ard of review to determine whether the pregnancy exclusion was a denial of
 
equal protection of the law was the "heightened scrutiny" we applied in Reed 
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), for sex-based classifications, where we did not sim-
ply accept, without critical examination, any proffered rational basis put forth
 
by the state. The lower court determined that the exclusion was based on the
 
same sort of stereotypes about women's maternal role versus their public and
 
workplace role that led us to invalidate the automatic preference for male
 
estate administrators in Reed. Under this more rigorous standard of review, the 
exclusion of pregnancy was not at all related to the statutory purpose, since
 
women who are experiencing temporary disability related to pregnancy are
 
just as much in need of economic support as are workers who are experien-
cing temporary work disruption because of the physical effects of any other
 
condition. The lower court thus rejected California's proffered rationale that
 
fiscal concerns for the solvency of the program under the current contribution
 
and benefit structure warranted the exclusion of pregnancy, noting that the
 
state had numerous sex-neutral options for maintaining fiscal solvency while
 
covering disabilities relating to pregnancy. Aiello v. 1-fansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 
(N.D. Cal. 1973). 
California appealed. 
III 
Before turning to the merits, we must determine whether recent revisions to
 
the interpretation of California's pregnancy exclusion render the claims of
 
three of the four plaintiffs moot, and if so, how to reframe the issue we must
 
decide. Just prior to the lower court ruling, the California Court of Appeal
 
determined that S 2626 did not bar disability benefits for work absences neces-
sitated by conditions related to complications associated with an abnormal
 
pregnancy, such as ectopic pregnancy. Rentzer v. California Unemp. Ins. 
Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 6o4 (1973). This decision was issued just days before the 
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district court ruling here, and the lower court rejected California's motion 
to reconsider its decision in light of Rentzer. The state accepted the statu-
tory construction adopted by the court in Rentter, and subsequently issued 
administrative guidelines that the exclusion of pregnancy-related condi-
tions in S 2626 applied only to exclude payment for "maternity benefits," 
i.e., hospitalization and disability benefits for normal pregnancy, delivery, 
and recuperation. Based on Rentzer and the new administrative guidelines, 
Appellees Aiello, Armendariz, and Johnson, who suffered from the disabling 
effects of ectopic pregnancies and miscarriage, became eligible for bene-
fits, and their claims have now been paid. Their claims are thus moot, and 
only the challenge of Ms. Jaramillo continues to present a live controversy. 
Consequently, the issue we must decide in this appeal is whether the exclu-
sion from California's otherwise comprehensive disability insurance program 
of temporary disabilities associated with normal pregnancy and childbirth 
constitutes a sex-based exclusion that disadvantages women and perpetu-
ates their economic and social subordination, and thus violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
IV 
To determine whether California's exclusion of conditions associated with nor-
mal pregnancy violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must first determine 
whether it is based on or related to sex, and if so, operates to disadvantage 
women. The lower court assumed that exclusion based on pregnancy, which 
only women experience, and which thus adversely impacts only women, is sex 
related and discriminatory. While this conclusion seems obvious, Appellant 
and Justice Stewart and the other dissenting justices strenuously contend that 
pregnancy-based classifications are not sex-based discrimination. Thus, before 
embracing the intuitively obvious, we must examine the issue in greater depth, 
"being ever mindful of the historical context we outlined at the outset. 
The capacity to become pregnant and bear children quintessentially dis-
tinguishes women from men. Thus, pregnancy is inextricably a sex-based 
distinction - only women can become pregnant. Appellant contends that 
this biological fact makes pregnancy unique and that as a result, pregnant 
women simply are not similarly situated to men, and so classifications based 
on pregnancy thus do not inevitably constitute sex discrimination. As Justice 
Stewart puts it in his dissent, by excluding only pregnancy from the covered 
risks, "there is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. 
Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not." 
417 U.S. at 496-97. 
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There are several flaws in this reasoning. First, Appellant's and the dissent-
ers' focus on the "uniqueness" of pregnancy, and their comparison of the phys-
ical risks women are protected from with those that men are protected from, 
are irrelevant to the purpose and structure of California's disability insurance 
program. As explicitly stated in California Unemployment Insurance Code S 
2601, the program's broad purpose was to protect workers from the economic 
hardship of periods of being physically or mentally unable to work, regardless 
of the reason for the disability or the nature of the underlying physical condi-
tion that caused the disability. California's program simply was not structured 
to protect workers only from some physical risks, and not others. The unique-
ness of a physical condition to one sex or the other is of no import. Indeed, 
with the notable exception of pregnancy, the program covers disabilities stem-
ming from several sex-specific risks, including prostatectomies, hysterecto-
mies, and treatment for endometriosis .. 
The question whether the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities leaves 
women similarly situated to men cannot be answered by facile resort to the 
uniqueness of pregnancy. It must be answered solely with reference to the 
purpose of the program, not to the nature of the underlying risk or cause of 
the temporary disability. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. Thus, the relevant compari-
son to determine whether women are treated equally is whether women have 
as comprehensive coverage as men do for all the normal and likely conditions 
and risks that may render them temporarily unable to work. Using the purpose 
of the insurance program as the frame for analysis, the relevant comparative 
group is not, as the dissent proposes, the women-only group of pregnant per-
sons versus the mixed gender group of non-pregnant persons. Rather, it is the 
male-only group of workers who receive disability payments when temporar-
ily unable to work due to any condition or risk that they might conceivably 
face, and the group, including only women, who receive a much less compre-
·hensive level of protection, since women cannot receive insurance payments 
when temporarily disabled due to a condition they commonly experience. 
Normal pregnancy, like all the other conditions whose effects men are pro-
tected from, requires medical care, can lead to periods of sickness, hormonal 
imbalance, hospitalization, and surgery such as episiotomies, and can require 
periods of rest and absence from work in order to recover from its physical 
and mental effects. Absences from work due to the effects of pregnancy and 
childbirth can lead to economic hardship for women and their families. The 
effects of pregnancy, physical and economic, are no different from the effects 
of all the conditions for which men receive disability insurance payments. By 
excluding pregnancy-related conditions, California creates a vast difference 
in the comprehensiveness of coverage for men and women, and fails to treat 
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the uniquely female condition of pregnancy the same as any and all condi-
tions that render male workers temporarily unable to work. This constitutes 
sex-based discrimination. 
This framework of comparison for determining whether women workers 
are treated equally to male workers is consistent with the interpretation of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency 
charged with interpreting and enforcing Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
42 U.S.C. S 2oooe et seq. (1970 ed. Supp. II), the federal statute prohibiting 
employment discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sex. The 
EEOC has declared: 
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, 
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, tempor-
ary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary 
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employ-
ment. Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving 
matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability 
of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, 
reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insur-
ance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due 
to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are 
applied to other temporary disabilities. 
29 CFR S 1604.10 (b). 
The EEOC adopted this interpretive guideline for Title VII's ban on sex 
discrimination in employment after carefully scrutinizing both employer 
practices and their crucial impact on women. Based on this examination, "it 
became increasingly apparent that systematic and pervasive discrimination 
against women was frequently found in employers' denial of employment 
opportunity and benefits to women on the basis of the childbearing role, per-
formed solely by women." Br. for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 10. 
While this case requires us to interpret the Constitution, rather than Title 
VII, the EEOC's expertise in what constitutes sex discrimination in employ-
ment is highly instructive. The agency's conclusion that the failure to treat 
pregnancy-related disabilities the same as all other conditions that render 
workers temporarily unable to work constitutes sex-based discrimination bol-
sters our similar determination that California's exclusion of pregnancy-related 
conditions deprives its women workers of equal treatment under the law. 
In addition to using an irrelevant comparative framework focused on the 
nature of the risk rather than the effect of the condition, Appellant's and the 
dissent's focus on the "uniqueness" of pregnancy raises the question of why 
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women should be deprived of workplace benefits for engaging in procreative 
activity when men are not. Surely a better justification than the uniqueness of 
women's way of procreating compared with men's should be required before 
women are disadvantaged. Moreover, the assertion that pregnancy is unique 
and that pregnancy's "uniqueness" removes it from the reach of the Equal 
Protection Clause simply enshrines male biology, needs, benefits, and priv-
ileges as the supposedly objective norm against which all equal protection 
claims for sex discrimination should be assessed. Pregnancy is "unique" only 
because it is not something that males experience. The physical risks that men 
are protected from- even those that are biologically unique to men- should 
not become the sole yardstick for assessing whether women are adequately 
covered for all the risks they might experience. While failing to accord women 
who are similarly situated to men the same treatment as men can certainly 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, see Reed, 404 U.S. at 76, it is not the only 
type of gender-based distinction that can deprive women of the equal protec-
tion of the law. An equality doctrine that implicitly says that women can claim 
equality only insofar as they are just like men is an impoverished concept 
of equality, unable to protect women from the disadvantages they have long 
suffered because of sex role stereotypes often based on their biological, repro-
ductive "uniqueness." Being biologically different from men does not have to 
mean that women should be disadvantaged or subordinated due to their dif-
ference. Women are entitled not only to equal treatment with men, but also to 
equal opportunities for education, employment, and civic participation with-
out barriers emanating from laws and policies that are based on stereotypes 
about women's "natural" roles. See Pauli Murray and Mary Eastwood, Jane 
Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
232 (1965). 
The way in which women contribute to procreation, by becoming pregnant 
and giving birth to a child, has accompanying physical risks that can lead to 
a period of physical inability to work. The way in which men contribute to 
procreation, by impregnating, does not have similar physical risks. Thus, a dis-
ability insurance plan that excludes physical conditions related to pregnancy 
imposes an economic penalty on women who engage in procreative activity, 
but imposes no such economic deprivation on men. As we intimated earlier 
this term in LaFleur, when we found it unconstitutional to make unpaid mater-
nity leave mandatory at a predetermined point during pregnancy regardless of 
an individual's ability to work, laws and policies that deny equal employment 
opportunities to women because of their procreative role can infringe on their 
right to reproductive liberty. The present case makes it evident that denial of 
equal employment opportunity to women because they are pregnant not only 
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infringes reproductive liberty, but it also undermines equality between the 
sexes. Men are not at risk ofloss of employment, disability protection, senior-
ity, or economic security when they decide to procreate. Women too often are, 
not because of the uniqueness of their procreative role, but because of the way 
laws and workplace policies choose to treat that role. Laws such as California's 
exclusion of pregnancy-related conditions from the disability insurance plan 
place economic burdens on women for procreating that no man ever has to 
face for his procreative activity. 
For all these reasons, we reject as fatally flawed the arguments against regard-
ing differential treatment on the basis of pregnancy as a form of sex discrimina-
tion. The focus on the unique biological differences between men and women. 
distracts from the salient question of whether the state may enact laws that 
make women's biological difference a justifiable reason for economic and 
social inequality. The "uniqueness" of pregnancy does not exempt from the 
scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause the kind of policies and laws that single 
out pregnant workers for adverse treatment. Indeed, pregnancy's unique associ-
ation with women, and the long history of stereotypes about women's capacities 
and proper roles that have led to so many forms of excluding women from the 
workplace due to the capacity to bear children, make it all the more essential 
to determine whether the sex discrimination effectuated by such policies and 
practices violates women's right to equal protection of the laws. 
v 
Having concluded that California's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities 
from its disability insurance program constitutes discrimination on the basis 
of sex, we must determine the appropriate standard of review for analyzing 
whether this discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
California argues that as a social welfare program, exclusions from coverage 
should be reviewed under the deferential rational basis standard of review. 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,483 (1970). Under this standard of review, 
absent a showing that the distinction involving pregnancy is a mere pretext 
intended invidiously to discriminate against women, the state's lawmakers are 
constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of this 
social welfare legislation on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any 
other physical condition. 
The state's argument for the rational basis standard of review, however, 
is inextricably linked to its rejected contention that the exclusion of preg-
nancy is not a form of sex-based discrimination. As our recent decisions in 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, and Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677, make clear, when a legislative 
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classification is based on sex, as the exclusion of pregnancy in S 2626 undoubt-
edly is, we must apply a standard of scrutiny more strict than the mere rational 
basis review accorded to general social welfare legislation. 
In Reed, we unanimously applied what an eminent constitutional scholar 
has labeled a heightened rational basis test "with bite" to invalidate a statutory 
preference for males as estate administrators over females. Gerald Gunther, 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on 
a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
12, 20 (1972). We ruled that the Equal Protection Clause denies "to States the 
power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by 
a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the 
objective of the statute." 404 U.S. at 75-76. "A classification 'must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a 
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" I d. at 76. We then concluded 
that the preference for men over women was rooted in irrational stereotypes 
about the relative capabilities and experience of men and women, and bore 
no relation to the purpose of achieving efficient administration of estates. 
In Frontiero, a plurality of this Court went further, and declared that "clas-
sifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or 
national origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to 
close judicial scrutiny." 411 U.S. at 682. We reached this conclusion based 
on our nation's long history of discrimination against women, noting that the 
discrimination was often based in romantic paternalism and stereotypes about 
women's capacity due to their maternal roles and household responsibilities. 
We further noted that sex-based classifications, like racial classifications, often 
bear no relationship to the ability to perform or to contribute to society, or to 
the actual capabilities or needs of individual women and men. I d. at 686-87. 
It is now time to take the next step in the natural evolution from Reed 
to Frontiero, and definitively hold that sex-based legislative distinctions that 
rest on stereotypes that constrain equal opportunity, or that cause or perpetu-
ate economic or social disadvantage or subordination, should be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. The need for heightened scrutiny is especially warranted when 
a sex-based distinction affects the fundamental right to reproductive liberty, 
as in the area of pregnancy, and the decision whether or not to bear a child 
without government-imposed restrictions or burdens. See, e.g., Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); LaFleur, 414 
U.S. 632. The government must advance a compelling interest when it makes 
a sex-based classification, and the classification must be necessarily related to 
achieving that compelling interest. 
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This does not imply that any sex-based classification or benefit or program 
should automatically be invalid, or that the sexes must always be treated exactly 
the same for all purposes. Mter all, while inequality can result from not treating 
men and women as alike when they are, it can also result from treating men 
and women as the same when they are in fact differently situated for a relevant 
purpose. Heightened scrutiny does not mean blindness to the fact that differ-
ences between the sexes may warrant policies or practices supporting truly dif-
ferent needs, such as job-protected pregnancy leave, or opportunities to breast 
feed at work, or to take breaks in order to pump milk. Nor would strict scrutiny 
automatically invalidate laws or programs intended to facilitate participation in 
the public sphere in order to alleviate historical discrimination. See, e.g., Kahn 
v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Laws aimed at overcoming structural impedi-
ments that have caused or exacerbated traditionally subordinated status or 
denial of opportunity stemming from real differences or from stereotypes about 
the import of differences may also be justified under a heightened standard of 
review. Nor does strict scrutiny mean that widely accepted social practices rest-
ing on notions of privacy and safety, such as sex-segregated public restrooms, 
which, unlike racially segregated public facilities, do not seem to subordinate 
or stigmatize any group, would be invalid. 
As we recounted at the outset of this opinion, the long history of women's 
exclusion from equal opportunities in employment, education, and civic 
participation - most often due to their reproductive capacity - demonstrates 
the need to subject the purported justifications for sex-based distinctions to 
searching examination, ever sensitive to the potential that stereotypes about 
women's capacity and supposed natural role lurk beneath the law. There 
is a persistent, deeply entrenched ideology in our society and legal system 
that men and women are naturally suited to different roles and prefer to, or 
should, primarily occupy different, separate spheres. The male sphere has 
been the public world of the workplace, of politics, and culture, while the 
female sphere is the private world of family and home. Ingrained stereotypes, 
cultural attitudes, institutional structures, and legal classifications that seem 
natural actually operate to entrench the separate spheres, thus constraining 
and limiting the lives of women and men. The presumably well-meaning 
celebration of women's unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied 
women equal opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities, 
and has constrained them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society. 
See Br. for the ACLU as Amicus Curiae. Women are often pushed out of the 
public sphere of the workplace when they exercise their reproductive capa-
city, relegated to the home, dependency, and economic insecurity. The "male 
breadwinner" ideology also limits men from more active engagement in the 
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realm of the home and the joys and challenges of child-rearing, often to the 
detriment of their emotional and physical well-being. 
California offers two principal justifications for excluding pregnancy from 
its disability insurance program. First, the state asserts that normal pregnancy 
is a voluntary condition, and thus pregnancy does not conceptually fit within 
a program to compensate for illness and injury. This argument is a variant 
of the focus on the difference or "uniqueness" of pregnancy. Second, and 
most prominently, California contends that the exclusion is based on cost 
concerns, and the need to maintain the fiscal solvency of the disability insur-
ance program and its current structure of employee contributions and bene-
fits. California asserts that it would cost upwards of $120 million per year to 
cover pregnancy-related illnesses, and this cost would soon overwhelm the 
program, necessitating either sharp increases in premiums or drastic reduc-
tions in benefits.'B 
The voluntariness of many normal pregnancies does not withstand scrutiny 
as a real, rather than a litigation-inspired, rationale for excluding pregnancy-
related conditions. Not all pregnancies are voluntary or desired. And no 
doubt the temporary physical disabilities that can accompany normal preg-
nancy are neither voluntary nor desired. Moreover, the comprehensive 
disability program covers other temporary disabilities, illnesses, and injur-
ies that result from numerous voluntary activities or medical procedures. 
Workers temporarily unable to work because they choose to have voluntary, 
non-medically-necessary cosmetic surgery or sterilization procedures are fully 
covered. Workers temporarily disabled due to injuries incurred as a result of 
voluntary and normal activities, such as playing sports and driving cars, are 
fully covered. To single out pregnancy from all the other voluntary activities 
covered by the program is arbitrary, and thus an illegitimate reason under any 
standard of review. 
· Turning to the rationale that it would be too costly to cover temporary 
disabilities related to normal pregnancy, California asserts that based on 
experience in other states, well over half of the payments from the fund 
would have to go to cover these disabilities. While the precise amount 
of increased cost cannot be verified, and Appellees contend that the cost 
would be far less than California estimates,29 it is undisputed that benefit 
,s This is substantially the same argument that the State advanced and the court accepted in 
Clark v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 332. P. :z.d 716 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 
1958), that is, that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities is necessary to protect the 
solvency of the disability insurance program. . 
"'~ Appellant estimates the increased cost of including normal pregnancy at $1:z.o.:z. million to 
$131 million annually, a 33 percent and 36 percent increase. Appellees estimate the increased 
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costs will increase with an expansion of coverage. It is also undisputed that 
California would likely have to increase the required level of employee 
contributions above the current 1 percent, or would have to slightly raise 
the current $85 cap on annual contributions, thus making the program 
somewhat more costly for workers. 
California also contends that because women workers generate a greater 
rate of claims, women already receive a greater share of benefits from the 
fund than men. Appellant submitted to the district court data indicating 
that both the annual claim rate and the annual claim cost are greater Jor 
women than for men. As the district court acknowledged, "women contribute 
about 28 percent of the total disability insurance fund and receive back about 
38 percent of the fund in benefits." 359 F. Supp. at 8oo. 
This latter contention about women generating more claims and receiv-
ing a greater share of benefits cannot be California's actual reason, or a 
legitimate reason, for excluding pregnancy-related disabilities.3° It is an argu-
ment based on actuarial principles, and California deliberately and carefully 
structured its fund so as not to rest on actuarial calculations. For example, 
workers' contributions are not set according to their level of individual risk 
of incurring conditions that will generate claims, or the likely cost and dur-
ation of those claims. Contributions do npt rise for any group of workers 
when their group generates a large percentage of claims. All workers pay 
1 percent of their income up to $85 per year, regardless of individual or 
group actuarial risk. Indeed, the program has a scale of benefits designed 
so that its likely effect will be that those earning small incomes (a group 
disproportionately composed of women workers, see Tr. of Oral Arg.) will 
receive more in benefits than they qontribute. See Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code 
S 2655. California conceded in the lower court that under its system, "the 
right to benefits should not have any relationship to the amount contributed 
to the fund." 359 F. Supp. at 8oo. Bec~use the purpose and structure of the 
California disability compensation program do not limit benefits to various 
groups based upon actuarial considerations, the state certainly cannot justify 
limiting benefits for pregnant women on this basis. 
cost at $48.9 million annually, a 12. percent increase. California assumes that most women will 
remain out of work for twelve weeks or longer after childbirth, while Appellees contend that 
most leaves will be six to eight weeks, the time that the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecologists estimates the average woman is physically disabled from working after child-
birth. Br. for Appellees at 59-60. 
JO Similarly, under the EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, "[i]t shall not be 
a defense under title VIII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such 
benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other." 29 CFR S 16049 (e). 
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The state's contention that including pregnancy will un
dermine the solv-
ency of the program similarly does not withstand even a 
modest level of scru-
tiny. As the lower court noted: 
Even using defendant's estimate of the cost of expanding
 the program to 
include pregnancy-related disabilities, however, it is clear
 that including 
these disabilities would not destroy the program. The incre
ased costs could 
be accommodated quite easily by making reasonable chan
ges in the con-
tribution rate, the maximum benefits allowable, and the
 other variables 
affecting the solvency of the program. For example, the ent
ire cost increase 
estimated by defendant could be met by requiring worke
rs to contribute 
an additional amount of approximately [o.364] percent of
 their salary and 
increasing the maximum annual contribution to about $119.
 
359 F. Supp. at 798. 
Appellant contends, however, that California should be a
ble to abide by its 
reasonable policy choice to limit contributions to their cu
rrent threshold, and 
to pay the current level of maximum benefits. While this 
may well be the case 
under the Dandridge v. Williams rational basis standard of revie
w, 397 U.S. at 
483, it is not a sufficient justification for sex-based discrimin
ation, especially one 
that also burdens women's exercise of their reproductive
 liberty. California's 
interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its disability in
surance program as 
currently constituted simply cannot render its use of a susp
ect classification con-
stitutional. For while "a State has a valid interest in preservi
ng the fiscal integrity 
of its programs[,] ... a State may not accomplish such a 
purpose by invidious 
distinctions between classes of its citizens ... The saving of
 welfare costs cannot 
justify an otherwise invidious classification." Shapiro v. Thompson
, 394 U.S. 618, 
633 (1969). Thus, when a statutory classification is subject 
to strict judicial scru-
tiny, the state "must do more than show that denying [ben
efits to the excluded 
class] saves money." Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415
 U.S. 250, 263 
(1974); see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-375 (197
1). 
When California's particular explanations for why it wo
uld be too costly 
to cover disabilities related to normal pregnancy are mo
re closely examined, 
it becomes evident that the program's disadvantageous t
reatment of women 
due to their reproductive capacity rests on the same ille
gitimate stereotypes 
about women's presumed physical limitations and their
 proper and natural 
role within the home that underlie other forms of employ
ment discrimination 
against pregnant women. 
Sex-role stereotypes can easily lead to an exaggeration o
f the feared costs 
of pregnancy disability benefits. California's anticipatio
n that most women 
will require lengthy periods of post-childbirth leave lon
ger than six to eight 
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weeks rests on the same stereotypes about the physical frailty and incapacity 
of all pregnant women that we recently rejected in LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 644. 
Like the forced maternity leave at issue in LaFleur, the denial of benefits for 
pregnancy-related disabilities seems to have its roots in the belief that all preg-
nant women are incapable of work for long periods of time, and therefore, 
they will generate large disability claims.3' The truth of this belief is certainly 
suspect. As we noted in LaFleur, while striking down mandatory maternity 
leave for pregnant schoolteachers commencing well before and extending for 
three months after delivery, not all women are physically affected by preg-
nancy in the same way and for the same duration. Many women will be fully 
physically capable of returning to work within a few weeks after childbirth; 
others will require longer leaves. · 
As the district court pointed out: 
the treatment of pregnancy in other cultures shows that much of our soci-
ety's views concerning the debilitati~g effects of pregnancy are more a 
response to cultural sex-role conditioning than a response to medical fact 
and necessity ... Indeed, a realistic look at what women actually do even 
in our society belies the belief that they cannot generally work throughout 
· pregnancy ... Nevertheless, the belief that pregnant women are disabled 
for substantial periods results in their being denied the opportunity to work, 
unemployment compensation benefits designed to aid those able to work, 
and -because of the belief that they will submit large claims - disability 
insurance benefits. 
359 F. Supp. at 799 (citations omitted). 
The sex-role stereotypes in operation are even more starkly revealed by an 
additional argument advanced to substantiate California's fear that it will cost 
too much to remove the pregnancy exclusion. The state argues that the preg-
nancy exclusion is necessary to prevent abuse of the program by women who 
have no desire to return to work because they prefer to remain home with 
their children. 359 F. Supp. at Boo. The state's argument depends on several 
unsubstantiated assumptions: These women - presumably many or most -
will be able to find sympathetic physicians who support women staying home 
with their babies, and who will certify them as disabled for as many weeks 
as possible, so that the women can reap maximum benefits. Many of these 
women will then never return to work. In other words, California argues that 
l' Indeed, as noted above, the starkly differing cost estimates of Appellants and Appellees stem 
from differing assumptions about the length ofleaves that women will take. California assumes 
leaves will average longer than eight weeks, while Appellees take individual's varying physical 
and economic situations into account and estimate that most women will require shorter leaves. 
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the pregnancy exclusion is necessary to prevent women from using the disabil-
ity program as a maternity leave program. Indeed, the state explicitly defended
 
the pregnancy exclusion on this basis when it was initially challenged on
 
equal protection grounds in state court. Clark v. California Employment 
Stabilization Com., 332 P.2d 716 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1958). The state court 
uncritically accepted this rationale: "[T]o award disability compensation to 
women employees on account of illness caused by pregnancy, [would] in
 
effect, constitute[] a maternity benefit plan for a limited group, i.e., women
 
employees. The purpose of the unemployment disability program is to afford
 
relief to employees sustaining loss of wages on account of illness, and not to
 
confer maternity benefits." Id. at 719. 
This rationale for the pregnancy exclusion is inextricably rooted in the 
archaic sex-role stereotypes that underlie the separate spheres ideology. The
 
exclusion reflects the idea that women are mothers first, and workers second.
 
This ideological belief assumes that most women will, and should, leave the
 
workforce when they have children. See Br. for ACLU as Amicus Curiae. 
These are precisely the type of sex-role stereotypes that led us recently to
 
reject sex-based laws in Reed and Frontiero. Moreover, this archaic stereotype 
ignores the greatly increased workforce participation of women (currently
 
almost 39 percent of women with children under six are in the workforce),
 
and the fact that nearly two-thirds of all women who work do so of neces-
sity: either they are unmarried or their husbands earn less than $7 ,ooo per year. 
See United States Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Why Women Work 
(rev. ed. 1972); United States Department of Labor, Employment Standards
 
Administration, The Myth and the Reality (May 1974 rev.). Appellee Jaramillo, 
for example, is the sole economic support for her family, and she juggles work
 
outside the home and family responsibilities while her husband pursues his
 
education. The other Appellees are also the sole economic support for their
 
households. They are far more typical of working women than Appellant's
 
stereotyped assumptions acknowledge. 
To the extent that some women do in fact leave the workforce when they 
bear children, California's exclusion of pregnancy has all the earmarks of a
 
self-fulfilling prophecy. If women are treated by the state and their employers
 
as detached from the workforce when pregnancy disables them, it is not sur-
prising that some respond to the disincentives barring their way to return and
 
thus fulfill Appellant's stereotyped vision of women's place post-childbirth. Br. 
for ACLU as Amicus Curiae. 
Concerns about the cost of providing equal disability coverage to women 
are not a sufficient rationale for the sex-based exclusion of pregnancy-related
 
disability, especially where, as here, these cost concerns evince stereotypes
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about women's role in reproduction as incompatible with workforce participa-
tion. This case highlights that barriers to women's full workforce participation 
are caused not by women's biological differences from men, but by the way 
our laws, governments, and employers choose to treat those differences. 
The stay previously issued by this Court is vacated, and the judgment 
of the District Court striking down the pregnancy exclusion in California 
Unemployment Insurance Code S 2626 is affinned. 
